Before you get to the blogs further down…

Welcome! Check out the links on the menu above to find out about Small Blue Green World. This is the gateway to the various blogs and bits and bobs that constitute the SBGW presence on the web.

Essentially, this is a consultancy offering services to the security industry, launched by David Harley in 2006 and with one main customer (ESET), so this particular page isn’t maintained very regularly: it has (currently) no commercial/advertising function, but it includes some papers/resources that may not be available elsewhere. The blogs linked here, however, especially those to which I contribute on ESET’s behalf, are maintained regularly.

The services I provide to ESET are quite wide-ranging, but they include blogging on the ESET blog page. I stopped contributing to SC Magazine’s Cybercrime Corner some time ago, and that page seems to have been removed. I’ll be looking back over my articles for that venue to see which might usefully be republished. Sometime…

I did write fairly regularly for Infosecurity Magazine, primarily on Mac issues, but haven’t done so for a while. Other authoring and editing includes conference papers, white papers and so on.

The ESET Threat Center and We Live Security pages include links to a range of resources. More specifically, the ESET resources page and includes white papers written specifically for ESET, papers for external conferences and workshops submitted on ESET’s behalf, links to articles written for outside publications and sites, again on ESET’s behalf, ESET’s monthly threat reports, for which I often provide articles and editing, while some of my conference presentations are available as slide decks here.

Some articles and conference papers can’t be posted on a commercial site for copyright-related reasons, so I tend to post them on this site instead. When I remember. Specifically, most of that stuff is now posted to Geek Peninsula.

AVIEN (formerly the Anti-Virus Information Exchange Network), which was run as an independent organization by myself and Andrew Lee (and before that by Robert Vibert), is still hosted on its own web site and has its own blog page hosted there, but I’m no longer heavily associated with the organization except as an occasional blogger there. I do maintain (intermittently) a phone scam resources page there.

I run several other specialist security blogs completely independently of ESET, and these include a blog focused on hoaxes, spam, scams and similar nuisances (thanks to ESET N. America CEO and long-time friend and colleague Andrew Lee, you can also access this as http://www.virushoax.co.uk), and another that focuses (mostly) on Apple malware: essentially, it’s the current incarnation of the old Mac Virus web site originally founded by Susan Lesch, and sometimes includes contributions from Old Mac Bloggit, the well-known pseudonym.

We no longer host the AMTSO blog, and  I don’t do any administration on the main AMTSO site any more. I do, however, maintain an independent AV-testing blog/resource called, imaginatively, Anti-Malware Testing, and this archives most of the articles I originally posted on the old AMTSO blog – of course, they do not represent AMTSO’s official views. I also blog occasionally at other sites, include Infosecurity Magazine,  (ISC)2 and Securiteam. I used to flag current articles, papers, blogs and media coverage at The Geek Peninsula (most of this is also tweeted via http://twitter.com/DavidHarleyBlog/) but I was having trouble remembering to update it. I’m now using it as a repository for (most of) my papers, some of my articles, pointers to my current and past blogs, and so on.

If you find any broken links on this site please let us know so we can fix them and please use the contact page to get in touch. Thank you.

David Harley
Small Blue-Green World
ESET Senior Research Fellow

EICAR 2011 Paper

And a big hand, please, for my EICAR 2011 paper!

This is a paper I presented last week at the EICAR conference in Krems, Austria, on “Security Software & Rogue Economics: New Technology or New Marketing?” Here’s the abstract:

A highlight of the 2009 Virus Bulletin Conference was a panel session on “Free AV vs paid-for AV; Rogue AVs”, chaired by Paul Ducklin. As the title indicates, the discussion was clearly divided into two loosely related topics, but it was perhaps the first indication of a dawning awareness that the security industry has a problem that is only now being acknowledged.

Why is it so hard for the general public to distinguish between the legitimate AV marketing model and the rogue marketing approach used by rogue (fake) security software? Is it because the purveyors of rogue services are so fiendishly clever? Is it simply because the public is dumb? Is it, as many journalists would claim, the difficulty of discriminating between “legitimate” and criminal flavours of FUD (Fear, Uncertainty, Doubt)? Is the AV marketing model fundamentally flawed? In any case, the security industry needs to do a better job of explaining its business models in a way that clarifies the differences between real and fake anti-malware, and the way in which marketing models follow product architecture.

This doesn’t just mean declining to mimic rogue AV marketing techniques, bad though they are for the industry and for the consumer: it’s an educational initiative, and it involves educating the business user, the end-user, and the people who market and sell products. A security solution is far more than a scanner: it’s a whole process that ranges from technical research and development, through marketing and sales, to post-sales support. But so is a security threat, and rogue applications involve a wide range of skills: not just the technical range associated with a Stuxnet-like, multi-disciplinary tiger team, but the broad skills ranging from development to search engine optimization, to the psychologies of evaluation and ergonomics, to identity and brand theft, to call centre operations that are hard to tell apart from legitimate support schemes, for the technically unsophisticated customer. A complex problem requires a complex and comprehensive solution, incorporating techniques and technologies that take into account the vulnerabilities inherent in the behaviour of criminals, end-users and even prospective customers, rather than focusing entirely on technologies for the detection of malicious binaries.

This paper contrasts existing malicious and legitimate technology and marketing, but also looks at ways in which holistic integration of multi-layered security packages might truly reduce the impact of the current wave of fake applications and services.

David Harley CITP FBCS CISSP
ESET Senior Research Fellow